




A N E C E SSA R Y  BUSINESS
In his famous dissenting judgment in Olmstead v. U.S.1 
Oliver Wendell Holmes characterized wiretapping (and by impli­
cation all forms of electronic eavesdropping) as “a dirty business”.
Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General for the United States 
of America, takes the position that the use of electronic eaves­
dropping by the police is inefficient and unnecessary, corrupting 
those who engage in it.2
With respect, both men are wrong —the former made wrong 
by changing times, the latter mistaken ab initio.
Electronic eavesdropping may now well be the most efficient 
way of combatting crime, especially organized crime. Criminals 
communicate verbally. There are no written records to seize, so 
their verbal communications — their weakest point — must be 
attacked. In the majority of cases there are no informants and it 
is impossible to get information in any other way.
In short, electronic surveillance is now a necessary business 
and, almost by definition, no longer a dirty one —the latter im­
plies the luxury of an alternate choice, which is no longer true. 
It is becoming more and more apparent that society must engage 
in this form of eavesdropping to the extent found necessary to 
protect itself. It is the bounds of this extent, not the question of 
whether or not society ought to engage in such activity, with 
which we must be concerned.
THE D EVICES
When George Orwell wrote “1984”3 he surfaced the possi­
bility of total surveillance of individuals for an indefinite period
t  Partially based on an address delivered O ctober 25, 1974 to the University of 
New Brunswick Law Students' Society. The views expressed are the author’s 
and not necessarily those of his em ployers.
* E.P. Craig, B.A., LL.B. (U .N .B.), temporarily in charge of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police Legal Branch, Ottawa.
1 O lm stead  v. U nited States  (1928), T il  U.S. 438.
2 Ramsey Clark, Crim e in A m erica  (1970).
3 G eorge Orwell, N ineteen Eighty-Four ( 1949).
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of time. Twenty five years ago the idea was pure fantasy; it no 
longer is.
Only five years ago microphones half the size of an ordinary 
cigar were still being used to secretly intercept private conversa- 
tions;when these “ancient” devices were implanted, a determined 
“bugee” could sometimes find the exposed end of microphone 
the size of a dime.
No more! Now a common household thimble can hold up to 
EIG HT extremely sensitive microphones, each capable of excel­
lent reproduction of the human voice up to distances of 50 feet. 
Each is concealable so not even a pinhole need show!
Other means of eavesdropping which have developed to date, 
however, are not nearly so efficient and claims concerning their 
potential are often exaggerated.4 There are physical barriers which, 
so far, are very effective in keeping limits on surveillance. Let’s 
look at the present state of the art.
There are three broad categories of electronic surveillance 
devices. There are effective devices (those that work very well), 
ineffective devices (which will work but are impractical) and 
future devices (those that don’t work — yet).
The effective devices include telephone taps, modified exist­
ing electrical sources (telephones, intercoms), reflectors activated 
by microwave beams through solid walls, tagging devices on vehicles 
(the so called “bumper beepers”), small radio transmitters and 
miniature microphones.
The impractical devices are those designed to pick up vibra­
tions created by voices and convert them into speech (contact, 
radar or laser microphones). They also include directional micro­
phones. The problem is interference, making their use unsatis­
factory in practice, although they will work under perfect condi­
tions.
Another technique, grossly exaggerated as to its effectiveness, 
is the “tagging” of individuals by secretly concealing miniature 
radio transmitters on their persons. Although we can miniaturize 
microphones, transmitters and receivers, to date we cannot do 
the same for power sources, especially batteries.
However, tremendous technological advances are still pos­
sible in the future. These include the perfection of tagging devices 
which will make it possible to monitor an individual 24 hours a 
day, miniature TV lenses which will permit visual surveillance,
4 As an exam ple see Alan F. W estin, Privacy and Freedom  (1967). Chapter 
Four deals with new techniques of physical surveillance but does not accur­
ately portray limitations on the effectiveness of existing technology.
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long range photography, use of lasers and even aerial viewing 
and listening devices with hovering capabilities.5
Some say “1984”, others say the year 2000, but sooner or 
later there will be no limit to the degree of surveillance possible. 
In the continuing transition from science fiction to reality the 
physical barriers which are our natural protection will disappear. 
We must then look to an artificial protection, the law, to define 
the permissible degree of invasion.
THE LA W
Until very recently the existing law was in a most unsatis­
factory state. English and Canadian tort law failed to develop a 
cause of action for invasion of privacy, creating a . . notable 
gap in our legal armoury”.6 Some provinces filled the gap by legis­
latively creating torts;7 another solution was the creation of quasi­
criminal offences in some provincial Telephone Acts.8 But crim­
inal sanctions were almost non-existent.
The Protection o f Privacy A c t9 is the first attempt to set 
the limits by federal legislation. It is described in detail elsewhere.10 
Generally, the Act is designed to establish control over the kind of 
eavesdropping achieved by artificial aids or enabling devices re­
ferred to in the Act as “electrom agnetic, acoustical, mechanical or 
other devices”, thus taking direct aim at electronic eavesdropping. 
Its basic approach is the forbiddance of all artificially aided inter­
ceptions of private communications (protection of the individual) 
with the provision of limited exceptions for law enforcement (pro­
tection of society).
It was the quest for the proper balance between the protec­
tion of individual privacy and the security of the state that was 
one of the major factors delaying passage of the Act for a num­
ber of years. In the end a compromise was reached with which no 
one is completely satisfied. Some are unhappy because the prac­
tice was not totally forbidden; others feel the police are unduly 
fettered. One thing is certain —the ban on electronic eavesdrop­
ping by the public was long overdue!
5 Ibid., 85-89.
6 John G. Fleming, The Law o f  Torts, 4th Ed. (1971), 533.
7 Privacy Acts, Stats, B.C. 1968, c.39; Stats. Man. 1970, c.74; Stats. Sask. 1974, 
c.80.
8 See in particular the M anitoba T elephone A c t, R.S.M. 1970, C.T40; A lberta  
G overnm ent Telephone A ct, R.S.A. 1970, c.12.
9 P rotection o f  Privacy A ct, Stats. Can. 1973-74, c.50, afterward interchangeably 
referred to as the Privacy A ct. It becam e law on June 30, 1974.
10 See Morris Manning, The P rotection  o f  P rivacy A c t  (1974); E.P. Craig,“The 
Protection of Privacy A ct” (1974), 36 R.C.M .P. G azette No. 4, 2.
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PUBLIC MISUSE
Some of the factors which accelerated public use and misuse of 
electronic eavesdropping devices in recent years were the growth 
of the private detective trade, simplification of equipment and 
techniques, miniaturization, a decrease in cost, and aggressive pro­
motion — all in the absence of legal controls."
While the existance of misuse is certain, its true extent is un­
known. In Canada some insight may be gained from the Sargent 
R eport12 —the result of a judicial inquiry into the use of listening 
devices by private business firms and private detectives in British 
Columbia. Among other things, the inquiry disclosed secret moni­
toring of conversations by car dealers, dance studios, real estate 
agencies, finance companies and health spas. The reasons for 
monitoring included protection of employees, checking sales 
methods and listening to customers to find out what factors would 
induce purchases or signing of contracts. For example, it was a 
common practice for a car dealer to leave a man and his wife 
“alone” in a sales booth where a modified intercom would often 
reveal the price to which they would go to buy a car. In the United 
States the nature, if not the extent, of use and misuse by the public 
is well d o cu m en ted  in A lan F. W estin ’s book , P rivacy and  
Freedom.13
There was extensive use of electronic eavesdropping, es­
pecially by private business, for three basic reasons. The first was 
industrial espionage, the attem pt to gain an edge on competitors. 
The second was internal monitoring of executives and employees 
to check efficiency or to prevent theft. This could be extensive; 
Westin cites as an example the fact that the American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company monitored 36 million long distance calls 
in 1965.14 The third reason was surveillance of customers to con­
trol shoplifting or to increase sales by finding out what the cus­
tomer was thinking. An extreme example of the latter was the 
bugging of a casket selection room !15
Westin also docum ents the use of electronic surveillance by 
professionals, in schools and universities, in personal, family, 
civil and political matters, by scientific researchers, by manage­
11 W estin. 90.
12 British Columbia. Report of the C om m ission  o f  Inquiry into Invasion of 
Privacy ( 1967), com m only known as the Sargent Report.
13 W estin. 104-118.
14 Ibid.. 113.
15 Ibid., 112.
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ment and labour, and even in the courts.16
The full extent of private use, as mentioned, is impossible to 
estimate. W ithout doubt it was fast becoming a recreational pas­
time before laws to curtail the practice were passed. One small 
insight came from an American m anufacturer of electronic eaves­
dropping equipment, which stated that out of total sales of $30 
million by his company in 1965, $4 1/2 million came from sales in 
Canada.17 Even if over-estimated by half, it is still a frightening 
figure!
POLICE USE
When we talk about the police use of electronic eavesdropping 
devices prior to the the Protection o f  Privacy A c t  we may employ 
the word “use” in two ways. In one sense there was extensive 
use against criminals — particularly those criminals involved in 
more serious crimes, such as drug trafficking and armed rob­
bery. In another sense there was limited use, when negative influ­
ences such as lack of manpower and the expense of equipment 
are taken into consideration.
Security matters aside, police have used electronic investiga­
tive means only against criminals, and then only against some crim­
inals. If a hypothetical may be used to illustrate the point: in a Can­
adian city with a population of 1000 criminals it might be tech­
nically possible to put only 15 under electronic surveillance at 
any one time!
Some of the statistics presented to the Justice and Legal Affairs 
Committee during its deliberation on the Protection o f Privacy 
A ct are illustrative. During the 10 year period from 1963 to 1973 
the Royal M ounted Police conducted 1,912 electronic intrusions,18 
with wiretapping used only by consent of one of the parties. In 
1972 the R.C.M.P. Security Service used wiretapping 152 times 
and electronic eavesdropping 84 times.19 In Montreal, during the 
16 month period from January, 1972 to April, 1973, 355 wiretaps 
were used, resulting in the arrest of 657 persons on 1353 criminal
16 In 1954-55 five jury deliberations in the U.S. were monitored with the permis­
sion of the judge and the attorneys. Intense criticism resulted in the passage of 
laws forbidding this practice. See W estin, 118.
17 Stanley M. Beck, “E lectronic Surveillance and the Administration o f Criminal 
Justice" (1968), 46 Can. Bar Review 643, at 646 quoting the Toronto Star, 
August 31, 1966.
18 M inutes o f the Standing Com m ittee on Justice and Legal Affairs, June 12, 
1973, Issue No. 15, at 8.
19 Ibid.
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charges.20
These figures hardly support the widespread misconceptions 
concerning the extent of police activity. Many members of the 
public believed that the use of electronic eavesdropping by the 
police was both indiscriminate and widespread. In fact, as the 
statistics indicate, it was purposeful and concentrated.
The primary purpose of police use prior to the Privacy A ct 
was the gathering of intelligence. It is a truism that a police force 
is only as good as its sources of information. It is also true that 
the foremost function of the police is, or should be, the prevention 
of crime. Prevention of particular crimes can only be accom­
plished through prior knowledge; if the police learn beforehand 
that a crime is going to be committed they can prevent it, but if 
they do not, they must deal with a fa it accompli.
There are two basic methods of obtaining information: indi­
rectly through the informants, or directly from the source. Of the 
two, the direct method is far more efficient because the reliability 
of the data is capable of immediate evaluation. Informants are 
notoriously unreliable. Both methods, of course, are repugnant 
to a degree but there is no alternative if society is to protect 
itself.
The secondary purpose of police use before the Privacy A ct 
was the gathering of evidence. However, there are less than a 
dozen reported cases in Canada where evidence obtained elec­
tronically was introduced in court; this illustrates the positive em­
phasis placed on obtaining intelligence.
The police, self-admittedly, were quite happy to use listening 
devices to find out what certain criminals were up to. Steps could 
then be taken to either prevent the intended crime or to catch the 
perpetrators in the act. This method had the distinct advantage 
of preserving the effectiveness of the devices — the nature and 
extent of their use was not compromised by testimony in open 
court.
In passing the Privacy A c t , our lawmakers, in spite of strong 
police objections, reversed the emphasis. Evidence gathering is 
now the primary purpose of electronic eavesdropping and the 
intelligence gathering purpose is severely limited, if not curtailed 
completely. This was accomplished by a combination of two fac­
tors; one intentional and the other not. The former is the require­
20 Brief presented to the Standing Com mittee on Justice and Legal Affairs by 
the Montreal Urban Community Police. See M inutes June 7, 1973, Issue 
No 14. at 15. This excellent brief accurately portrayed the importance of 
electronic surveillance to the detection and control of crime but was largely 
ignored by the members of the Com mittee in their final report.
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ment that police must know what the offence is before seeking per­
mission to make an interception,21 thus making it necessary to deter­
mine this information by other means — often impossible. The 
latter is the controversial necessity of notification.22
This reversal of emphasis, although prompted by the best of 
intentions, may cause many of the most serious crimes to remain 
undetected. In an attem pt to control abuse, real or imagined, of 
electronic surveillance by the police, a severe price may be paid.
Before commenting further on the intelligence question, 
let’s examine police “misuse” of electronic surveillance to see 
if it was irresponsible action by the police which brought on the 
severe restrictions of the Privacy Act.
POLICE M ISUSE
With few recorded exceptions, the police did not use elec­
tronic eavesdropping indiscriminately. Self imposed controls 
(policy), together with physical limitations, served to protect the 
general public (and even a large part of the criminal population) 
from electronic surveillance. The public was in far greater danger 
from itself than it ever was from the police.
To be fair, however, the existence and extent of police misuse 
is unknown —even to the police. There are no comprehensive 
statistics, no scandals, no glaring examples of flagrant misuse. 
From all that appears on the surface one could argue that the 
police have used the technique with discretion and restraint and 
whether the reported examples can actually be classified as misuse 
depends entirely upon one’s point of view.
In 1968 a public inquiry held in Toronto resulted in the 
Grant Report.23 One author described the report as . . a classic 
example of official interference with an individual’s right to pri­
vacy without due process of law.”24 The inquiry was induced by 
a police telephone tap on a well-known criminal, one Alexander. 
He was the prime suspect in a rash of burglaries and a tap was 
placed on his telephone after other investigative means failed. 
The tap was left on for two months and 60 hours of conversations
21 P rotection  o f  P rivacy A c t, ss. 178.12(c) and 178.13(2)(a).
22 Ibid., s. 178.23. All persons who are specified subjects of a judicially author­
ized interception of their private com m unications must eventually be told. 
The police are not seeking authorizations against som e of the most highly 
placed criminals because the requirement o f notification would probably 
destroy any chance of a future conviction.
23 Ontario, Inquiry Re Magistrate Frederick J. Bannon and Magistrate George  
W. Gardhouse ( 1968), com m only cited as the Grant Report.
24 Beck, 658.
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were taped. The tap revealed a relationship between Alexander 
and a Magistrate Bannon, including discussions on dispositions 
and sentences in cases pending before the courts. The police felt 
compelled to disclose the relationship and the inquiry eventually 
found Magistrate Bannon totally unfit for his office.
Public reaction virtually ignored the corruption exposed and 
centered on demands for legislation.25 The catalyst was the realiz­
ation that the police could tap a telephone for two months with 
no one knowing about it, as indeed no one outside the police 
would have known if the fact had not voluntarily been disclosed 
in the larger interest of removing an unfit magistrate.
Were the police blameworthy? Did they violate any inherent 
right to privacy in the absence of any law forbidding the practice? 
The questions are now academic, but the situation certainly illus­
trates the reason the police welcomed the advent of enabling 
legislation when the Privacy A c t was in the formulation stage.
Another example of police misuse, if it can truly be called 
that, is found in the case of R. v. Steinberg.26 The police executed 
a search warrant on a betting house, secretly installed a recording 
device while there and retrieved it the next day. A conviction 
resulted in a sentence of three months in jail plus a fine of $10,000. 
On appeal the fine was reduced to $5,000 because “We are not 
satisfied that that which occurred has the appearance of justice 
and we feel that the appearance of justice is an important element 
to be considered in criminal m atters”.27 R. v. Steinberg is but 
another mild illustration of the police dilemma prior to the Pri­
vacy A c t  —when, and whei: not, to use the devices.
A lot has been said ab o jt “fishing expeditions” in relation 
to the invasion of privacy by the police. An example of a true 
fishing expedition would be placing a listening device and waiting 
for anyone to come along and incriminate himself. A partial fish­
ing expedition would be “bi’gging” a known criminal or a criminal 
haunt to find out what is going on; in other words, you know some­
thing illegal is going on but you’re not sure what.
Related cases which illustrate a partial fishing expedition are 
R. v. Pearson, and R. v. Black et a/.28 A telephone was installed in
25 Ibid., 648.
26 R. v. Steinberg, [ 1967] 1 O.R. 733 (Ont. C.A.).
27 Ibid., 736.
28 R. v. Pearson  et al (1969), 66 W .W .R. 380 (B.C.S.C.); R  v. Black e t  al (1970),
72 W .W .R. 407 (B.C.C.A.).
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the clubhouse of a motorcycle gang. Telephone calls were record­
ed and the tapes were checked at intervals. While the tap was 
in place, members of the gang kidnapped a “butler”, and forced 
him to engage in sordid and degrading acts . . of a disgusting 
character for the most part of a sexual or quasi-sexual charac­
ter.”29 The gang members were convicted, partially on recordings 
of telephone calls. As in the case of the unfit magistrate, does 
the end sometimes justify the means?
This takes us directly back to the question of whether or 
not intelligence gathering is an integral part of police work, for 
partial fishing expeditions and intelligence gathering are the same 
thing.
Does the Privacy A c t give any scope at all to electronic intelli­
gence gathering? None whatsoever. The Act eliminates it com­
pletely. It requires an offence, a known quantity, before an author­
ization to use electronic surveillance may be sought. The difficulty, 
in many cases, is that the police may know something is being planned 
but may not know what offence is involved. Practice may modify 
the effect somewhat, but in theory if you don’t know what the sus­
pect is planning you shouldn’t ask for an authorization.
Surely there is a concurrent, if not paramount, necessity for 
the intelligence-gathering function in police work. In the war 
against crime —a war society is in danger of losing —the taking 
away of the most potent weapon in the hands of the police, who 
are confronted already by enemies who play by no rules at all, 
may prove to be an extremely serious mistake. We are now in 
the process of finding out.
SETTIN G  THE LIM ITS: SU M M A R Y  AN D  CONCLUSION
Prior to the passage of the Privacy A ct three factors were operat­
ing. First, improved technology meant increasing availability of 
sophisticated listening devices, at low cost. Second, there was 
ever increasing use of the devices, by police and the public. Third, 
there was lack of control — very little in the nature of legal sanc­
tions existed.
The third factor created a moral dilemma for the police. What 
use should be made of the new devices in the absence of any law 
forbidding their use? If it was not legally wrong to use them, was 
it morally wrong? The only guidelines, in many cases, were those 
formulated by police themselves. Each police force, in setting 
policy, had to decide how far to go. In this atmosphere the police 
were as anxious for legislative guidance as anyone.
29 R. v. Black, 411.
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It soon became evident by virtual consensus that use of the 
devices by the public should be totally forbidden. This consensus, 
however, had the effect of shifting attention away from public 
use, where most of the abuse had occurred, and focussing it com­
pletely upon police use.
The burning issue became whether or not law enforcement 
agencies should ever be permitted to use electronic eavesdropping 
as a means of investigation. The potential for disagreement had 
been illustrated by a report of the President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcem ent,30 which divided its opinion. The majority 
approved police use subject to stringent limitations. The minority 
felt there was . . insufficient basis to strike this balance against 
the interests of privacy”.31 The same arg u m en ts  erupted in 
Canada.
The Canadian Committee on Corrections recommended that 
the police should be allowed to use eavesdropping devices under 
controlled conditions.32 In the end Parliament, after considering 
the moral and ethical issues, agreed and opted to strike a balance, 
permitting exceptions to a total ban. It did, however, severely 
restrict the ability of the police to prevent crime, causing concern 
to many that the bounds had been too narrowly set.
Electronic surveillance, to the extent which it may be legally used, 
is now legitimized; as such it should no longer be considered a 
dirty business — it is a necessary business within the limits estab­
lished by law. These limits are set — for a time.
Who will determine what the limits eventually will be? We 
all will, at some time, directly or indirectly, whether as lawmaker, 
prosecutor, defence counsel, policeman, civil libertarian or just 
plain citizen. For the immediate future, law enforcement officers 
will be primarily concerned with the legal issue —operating within 
the limits as they now exist — and only secondarily involved 
with the moral and ethical issues. In the long term we must remain 
concerned with all three considerations, because of the inevitable 
revision of the Protection o f  Privacy Act. Experience will then 
tell us whether we must cut back or extend the degree of elec­
tronic surveillance now allowed.
30 United States, The Challenge o f  Crim e in a Free Society. Report by the Presi­
dent’s C o m m issio n  on Law E n fo rcem en t and Administration of Justice. 
W ashington (1967).
31 Ibid., 203.
32 Report o f the Canadian Com m ittee on Corrections ( 1969), 83. com m only  
known as the Ouimet Report.
